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his issue of EAP begins our 19th year. We
thank readers renewing their subscriptions
and include a reminder for “delinquents.”
The issue begins with architect Julio Bermudez’s report on Architecture Alive, a research
project exploring “extraordinary architectural experiences.” To gather descriptions of these experiences, Bermudez has set up an on-line survey. He
requests that EAP readers and other interested individuals participate in this survey, the web address of
which is provided in the project’s overview on p. 4.
Our three feature articles this issue focus on the
theme of place. Geographer Edward Relph reviews
philosopher Jeff Malpas’ Heidegger’s Topology, a
study of the significance of place in Heidegger’s
philosophy. In turn, Malpas responds to Relph’s review. Last, educator John Cameron describes his
deepening involvement with place as he and his
partner restore a homestead on Bruny Island, just
off the southeastern coast of Australia’s Tasmania.

bols as a Means for Interpreting Architecture”). The
issue is available at:

T

www.tu-cottbus.de/theo/Wolke/eng/Subjects/subject.html#A1
Below: sketches by Chinese artist and cartoonist Feng Zikai
(1898-1975) of Shanghai’s alley life; clockwise from top left:
Lowering a basket to purchase goods from a hawker; a huntun seller with his mobile kitchen on a shoulder pole; a peddler
selling straw mats; a street barber cleaning his customer’s
ears. These drawings appear in Chunlan Zhao’s “From Shikumen to New-style: A Re-reading of Lilong Housing in Modern Shanghai,” a chapter in J. Madge & A. Peckham’s Narrative Architecture—see p. 3. “Lilong” can roughly be translated as “alley-living,” whereby the narrow streets and alleys
of Shanghai’s dense urban neighborhoods became “a shared
living room and multifunctional space, through which a particular local dwelling culture was created” (p. 453).

Festschrift for Karsten Harries
The work of philosopher Karsten Harries plays a
pivotal role in phenomenological studies of architecture and place. The current issue of the German
architectural e-journal, Wolkenkuckucksheim, is devoted to Harries and includes a digital version of his
The Bavarian Rococo Church: Between Faith and
Aestheticism, originally published by Yale University Press in 1983. Contributors to the issue include:
Hagi Kenaan (“The Ground’s Hidden Surface”);
David Kolb (“Borders and Centers in the Age of
Mobility”); David Leatherbarrow (“Architecture,
Ecology, and Ethics”); James McQuillan (“Karsten
Harries: Beyond Care—An Architecture of Love”);
Juhani Pallasmaa (“The Space of Time: Mental
Time in Architecture”); and David Seamon & Enku
Mulugeta Assefa (“Karsten Harries’ Natural SymISSN: 1083-9194
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Donors, 2008

interesting. Seamon would like to organize another
EAP session at the Pittsburgh meetings, and readers
interested in participating should contact him as
soon as possible, certainly by February 1. Confernce information is at:
www.environmentalphilosophy.org

We are grateful to the following readers who have
contributed more than the base subscription for
2008. As always, we could not continue without
your generous support, and we thank you all!
Anonymous
Michael Branch
L. J. Evenden
Marie Gee
Alvin Holm
Susan Ingham
Michael Kazanjian
Evelyn Koblentz
Ted Lowitz
Doug Porteous
J. Reser
Mark Rosenbaum
Eva Simms
Ian Wight

Tom Barrie
Linda Carson
Kirk Gastinger
Steen Halling
Susan Hopkins
Sara Ishikawa
David Kermani
Ellen Lowery
Anne Niemiec
Carolyn Prorok
Leanne Rivlin
Gwendolyn Scott
Charlene Spretnak
Justin Winkler

Items of Interest
The conference, Thinking through Nature: Philosophy for an Endangered World, will be held
19-22 June 2008, at the University of Oregon in
Eugene. The conference is sponsored by the International Association of Environmental Philosophy
(IAEP). Key themes include: Environmental ethics;
aesthetics of natural and built environments; environmental restoration; architecture, place, and
dwelling; traditional ecological knowledge; ecocriticism; ecophenomenology; and environmental
metaphysics and theology. Keynote speakers include Gary Paul Nabhan, Director, Center for Sustainable Environments, Northern Arizona University; and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Architecture Program, McGill University. For further information,
contact Ted Toadvine, Philosophy & Environmental Studies, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR
97403-1295; Toadvine@uoregon.edu

Conference Presenters Needed!
There are two upcoming conferences that EAP readers might wish to attend and contribute paper presentations to. The 27th International Human Sciences Research Conference will be held 11-14
June 2008, at Ramapo College in Mahwah, New
Jersey, near New York City. Because of its small
size, this conference is always a great pleasure intellectually and communally. EAP editor David Seamon is organizing a special session on Goethean
science and would be happy to help with other “environmental” sessions that EAP readers might want
to organize. If so, please let him know by February
1. Abstract due date is 15 April. Additional information: http://www.seattleu.edu/artsci/psychology/ihsr.asp;

The International Association for the Study of
Environment, Space, and Place will hold its 4th
annual conference, 25-27 April 2008, at Towson
University in Towson, Maryland. The conference
theme is tourism. Abstracts for paper sessions are
due February 10. Contact: Troy Paddock at:
paddockt1@southernct.edu.

or: http://phobos.ramapo.edu/~hsr08ram/.

The Journal of Architectural Education will publish a thematic issue on “Immateriality in Architecture” in late 2008. The prospectus reads in part:
“Can today’s representational media emulate the
ineffable? How can we distinguish between the numinous and the merely luminous? Will new developments in the sciences, psychology, and philosophy bring new insights to the question of the immaterial in our increasingly material culture? The editors seek critical responses to the difficult task of
working materially with artifacts and places that are
also tangibly immaterial.” For readers interested in

Another upcoming conference to which EAP readers might wish to contribute is the 2008 meeting of
the International Association for Environmental
Philosophy (IAEP), to be held in Pittsburgh, 19-20
October, immediately following the annual meetings of SPEP (Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) and SPHS (Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences), 16-18 October. The double session sponsored by EAP at the
recent IAEP November Chicago meeting was well
attended, and the five presentations were varied and
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nologically-inspired writers. A wide-ranging hodgepodge with
no clear conceptual focus.

submitting manuscripts, contact the issue’s editors:
Thomas Barrie at: tom_barrie@ncsu.edu;
Julio
Bermudez at: bermudez@arch.utah.edu.

David A. Gruenewald & Gregory A. Smith, eds.,
2007. Place-Based Education in the Global Age:
Local Diversity. London: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Interdisciplinary Design and Research is a new
peer-reviewed e-journal on interdisciplinary design
sponsored by the Interdisciplinary Design Institute
at Washington State University, Spokane. Volumes
1 and 2 consider “Design and Health” and “Design
and Livability,” respectively. The editors welcome
research articles and design projects addressing any
facet of interdisciplinary design relating to any dimension of life experience. For more information,
go to: www.idrp.wsu.edu/index.html.

The 15 chapters of this volume focus on the theory and practice of place-based education and highlight three themes: understanding place-based pedagogy as part of a broader social
movement known as the “new localism,” which “aims toward
reclaiming the significance of the local in the global age”;
making links between ecological awareness and concerns
about equity and cultural diversity; presenting examples of
place-based learning in action. Includes EAP contributor John
Cameron’s “Learning Country: A Case Study of Australian
Place-Responsive Education.”

Phenomenology & Practice is a new human science e-journal dedicated to the study of the lived
experience of a broad range of human practices—
for example, pedagogy, design, counseling, psychology, social work, and health science. Increasingly, researchers and practitioners are adapting interpretive methodologies to address questions related to practice, and Phenomenology & Practice
serves as a forum for this work. For further information: http://www.phandpr.org/index.php/pandp/index.

Nigel Hoffmann, 2007. Goethe’s Science of Living
Form. Harlemville, NY: Adonis Press.
“…a disciplined search of Goethe’s methodological writing as
well as of other sources of phenomenological thinking [to develop] a method for a systematic practice of landscape study.”
The real-world focus is Yabby Ponds, an Australian locale.

Elizabeth A. Johnson & Michael W. Klemens, eds.,
2005. Nature in Fragments: The Legacy of Sprawl.
NY: Columbia Univ. Press.

Patterns in Applied Phenomenology (PAPH) is a
new book series devoted to works in which phenomenological methods, concepts, and research are
used to address concrete practical problems, or phenomenological insights are used to develop “phenomenologically-informed practices.” Further information at: paph@zetabooks.com.

Contributors focus on “the impact of sprawl on biodiversity
and the measures that can be taken to alleviate it.”

James Made & Andrew Peckham, eds. Narrative
Architecture: A Retrospective Anthology. NY:
Routledge, 2006.
This collection assembles articles from the Journal of Architecture that are said to “stand out after ten years of publication.” Themes include: architects’ design practice; issues of
materiality; narratives of domesticity; the sociology of architectural practice; and identity and appropriation of place. Note
the drawing on p. 1 of this EAP is from this collection.

Citations Received
Vincent B. Canizaro, ed., 2007. Architectural Regionalism: Collected Writings on Place, Identity,
Modernity, and Tradition. NY: Princeton Architectural Press.

Roger Paden, 2007. Mysticism and Architecture:
Wittgenstein and the Meanings of the Palais Stonborough. NY: Lexington Books.

This collection is said to bring “together over 40 key references, illustrating the full range of ideas embodied by the term
architectural regionalism. Authored by leading critics, historians, and architects, the collection represents the history of
regionalist thinking in architecture from the early 20th century
to today.” Includes some region-focused patterns from Christopher Alexander’s Pattern Language and Juhani Pallasmaa’s
“Tradition and Modernity: The Feasibility of Regional Architecture in Post-Modern Society” but, strangely, provides nothing by Edward Relph, Robert Mugerauer, or other phenome-

This philosopher studies “philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein
and the Viennese house that he helped design and build for his
sister shortly after he abandoned philosophy for more practical
activities.” Paden argues that the house “belongs to neither
architectural Modernism nor Postmodernism, but is instead
caught between the two movements.” The first volume in
Robert Mugerauer’s “toposophia” series (See EAP, 17, 2: 2-3).

3
ISSN: 1083-9194

3

Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 19 [2008], No.

Architecture Live
Julio Bermudez
rchitecture Live is a research project focusing on “extraordinary architectural experiences.” The emphasis is transformative phenomenologies of architectural delight, a phenomenon that by its very nature is largely intangible,
qualitative, experiential—even esoteric. What is
architectural delight? How does it take place? Why
and when does it happen? What is it like as an experience?
Architecture Live proposes that realizing the nature of delight needs to go no further than our own
live experience of architecture and may be greatly
facilitated by studying the most dramatic cases
available—namely, extraordinary architectural experiences.
Specifically, the goals of Architecture Live are:

A

•
•
•

3.

As part of this work, I would like to ask EAP
readers to complete a web-based survey on extraordinary architectural experiences. My aim is to collect a substantial number of qualitative descriptions
to support and challenge my research. My interest is
in the actual experience (or its absence). Completing the survey should take no longer than 10 minutes. Privacy of participants is guaranteed, and results from the study will be made available to all
participants. The survey is available at:

To develop appreciation for the profoundly qualitative in
architecture;
To improve understanding of both the ordinary and the
extraordinary in architectural phenomenology;
To assist in making environments that foster strong aesthetic experiences.

http://studentvoice.com/utah/ExtraordinaryArchitecture

Architectural Live pursues these goals by:
1.

2.

tecture is ordinarily experienced in third-person—i.e., as
an “it” fundamentally different from “me” and perceptually, emotionally, and intellectually detached from “me.”
Traditional phenomenological methods enable us to move
from such a limiting and instrumentalist view of architecture (as an “it”) to one of materialized intentionality that
actively interacts in a meaningful experiential conversation—a “you” and thus second person. There is also the
possibility of a total identification of self and other (i.e.,
the building)—an event in which subject and object are
merged into one (I = you = it).
Examining the role of the built environment as a potential
gateway to transcendental insights.

This research is described in greater detail at:
http://faculty.arch.utah.edu/alive/. For questions or
information, contact Dr. Julio Bermudez, University
of Utah College of Architecture + Planning, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84112; bermudez@arch.utah.edu.

Studying non-dual aesthetic events. Trustworthy testimonies of extraordinary architectural experiences consistently describe situations involving no separation between
subject and object. These experiences can be felt as unifying, intimate, and even transcendental identifications of
self and other.
Developing a thorough
phenomenological account
of architecture that coordinates what philosopher Ken
Wilber (Integral Psychology, 2000) has termed
“first-, second-, and thirdperson experiences.” Archi-
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Disclosing the Ontological Depth of Place:
Heidegger’ s Topology by Jeff Malpas
Edward Relph
Relph is a geographer who teaches in the Division of Social Sciences at Scarborough College, the University of
Toronto. His writings have been instrumental in demonstrating the value of a phenomenological approach for environmental and architectural concerns. His books include Place and Placelessness (1976), one of the earliest and
most accessible phenomenologies of place; Rational Landscapes and Humanistic Geography (1981), a powerful
explication of the Heideggerian notion of appropriation as a potential vehicle for a lived environmental ethic
grounded in respect and care for the Other—what Relph calls “environmental humility”; and The Modern Urban
Landscape (1987), an exploration of why cities of our time look the way they do. relph@scar.utoronto.ca. © 2008
Edward Relph.

A

What I think has happened is that, because
place is an everyday phenomenon with no precise
definition, it can be bent to fit any methodological
or disciplinary bias. For me, the only way to make
some sense of this confusion is to get back to what
preceded the big bang, to return to place as a phenomenon of experience and seek clarification there.
For this, Jeff Malpas has become a valuable guide,
including his most recent work, Heidegger’s Topology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
Over the last decade, Malpas and other philosophers—most notably Ed Casey, Ingrid Stefanovic and Robert Mugerauer—have established that
place has been an important philosophical concept
since the origins of Western philosophy, that it is
best understood phenomenologically, and that Heidegger’ s writings are crucial in this understanding.
In Heidegger’s Topology, Malpas takes this interest in place one step further by arguing that Heidegger’s thought is not just helpful in elucidating
place, but that place is at the root of Heidegger’ s
philosophy of being. Being and place are inextricably bound together in that being emerges only
through place; and place, through being.

few years ago in the Tate Modern Gallery
in London, there was an installation of the
reconstruction of an explosion of an ordinary garden shed. The room was filled with fragments of wood, tools, equipment and gardening
stuff, some recognizable, others not—suspended
from the ceiling to recreate a three-dimensional,
frozen moment of the explosion that visitors could
walk through. Something ordinary and everyday, all
in pieces, disconnected except by point of origin.
I recently began a comprehensive review of
what has been written about place in the last 20
years and it was like walking into the aftermath of
an academic explosion. What had once been a reasonably coherent body of thought, grounded in phenomenology and mostly the concern of humanistic
geographers and environmental psychologists,
seems to have flown off in all directions.
For example, Doreen Massey flatly rejects the
idea of places as sites of nostalgia and proposes instead that they are nodes in networks of social relations. Altman and Low define place as settings to
which individuals are emotionally and culturally
attached. For David Harvey “[p]lace, in whatever
guise, is like space and time, a social construct.”
GIS scientist Pragya Agarwal claims that “[p]laces
are proximal spaces,” while artist Lucy Lippard
writes that “[p]lace for me is the locus of desire.”
Neuroscientist John Zeisel uses MRI to locate
where in the brain our sense of place resides.

T

hough Heidegger’s Topology will no doubt be
contested by some Heidegger scholars, I find
the work original and immediately compelling.
Now that Malpas has brought the point to light, it is
clear to me that the idea of place is indeed power-
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more than a node in social networks. Place is neither something subjective and claimed by feelings,
nor is it objective location. In fact, it precedes all
notions of subjectivity and objectivity. It is a complex unity, integral to being, and encountered experientially as simultaneously unified, differentiated
from yet connected with other places, and gathering
together things, people, and our own lives.
Heidegger, of course, wrote and thought in
German and used a number of words that can be
translated into English as place—“Platz,” “Stelle,”
“Gegend,” “Statte,” “Ort,” and “Ortschaft.”
Though they have different shades of meaning,
these words can all be translated as “place” in English. “Platz” and “Stelle,” which Heidegger used
mostly in his earlier works, mean something like
“position.” “Ort” and “Ortschaft” (the latter literally translates as “placescape”) he used mostly in
his later writings, and the terms mean something
like ‘settled locality’ with the sense of things belonging together.
Since in English the word “place” itself has a
variety of meanings, such as location, setting, position, situation, social role, and context, there are
many possibilities for slippage in translation. Heidegger’s thought, however, seems to be an attempt
to delve through and behind language to reflect
upon what it is to experience being in the world.
Malpas argues that this originary experience of
being is an experience of place: “The question of
being is the question of how beings can emerge in
their interrelatedness and their distinctiveness from
one another” (p. 14). Beings and things in their concrete manifestations are always gathered together in
a place; we experience them as simultaneously
similar to and different from other things with
which they are related, and we experience a particular place as simultaneously distinct from yet similar
to and interrelated with other places.
At any given moment we see, hear, and touch a
specific assemblage of chairs, windows, buildings,
cars, people, plants, and so on; the world is always
and inevitably encountered in its rich particularity,
unity, and connectedness. For example, hearing as
an everyday experience involves the sound of some
specific thing, situation, or event—in Being and
Time, Heidegger points to the examples of hearing a

fully latent in all phases of Heidegger’s writing. It is
manifest in the language of Dasein (“a ‘da’ , a there,
a topos,” p. 14) and in the metaphors of “clearing,”
“way,” “dwelling,” and “homecoming” that comprise what Malpas calls Heidegger’s “topology,” a
word Malpas uses not in its mathematical sense but
in the sense of “a saying of place”—an attempt to
illuminate the place in which we always and already
find ourselves (p. 33).
This effort, Malpas suggests, is not unlike the
work of a traditional topographer attempting to inscribe a place from within through survey, triangulation, and traverse. Topology is thus a variant of
phenomenology, which Heidegger described in
1919 as “the investigation of life itself.”
For non-philosophers or readers not reasonably
familiar with Heidegger’s philosophy or obscure
language, this will not be an easy book. Heidegger’s
thought deals with what is near to us—with being,
existence and the everyday, immediate encounter
with a world that is already differentiated and connected, a world that is obvious but so rich and complex it is extremely difficult to write about.
But whether you like Heidegger’s writing or
not, whether you find his contact with Nazism abhorrent or not, there is very little doubt among philosophers about the originality and depth of his
thinking. Malpas covers the fifty-year span of Heidegger’s writing and teaching, including many of
his lectures available only in archives. The general
approach is chronological, and about a third of the
book discusses Heidegger’s earlier thought, especially in Being and Time; another third is about the
middle period of the 1930s and 1940s, including the
matter of Heidegger’s brief infatuation with National Socialism; and the last third is about Heidegger’s later thought that embraced poetry, dwelling,
and the questioning of technology.
It is this last phase that is most interesting for
many architects and other non-philosophers reading
Heidegger because it speaks most directly to the
world we experience in the present age.

M

alpas’ aim is to establish that the foundation
of Heidegger’s philosophy is the recognition
that, in finding ourselves in the world, we find ourselves already in place. Place is not just a bit of
space or a function of affectivity and is certainly
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motorcycle or the North wind and says that “[i]t requires a very artificial and complicated frame of
mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’ .”
The idea of “world” is central to Heidegger’s
thought. For him “is” did not mean everything that
is but Umwelt—an environing world of self, others,
and things that has a certain order and orientation.
So a return to the things themselves, the watchword
of phenomenology, means a return to the world itself—the one experienced prior to the onset of an
artificial frame of mind. In this return, truth consists
not of agreement about the state of things but of
disclosure—letting beings be seen as they are in
themselves. Malpas writes that because beings already exist in places, “the thinking of truth… also
brings with it a thinking of place” (p. 192).

possibilities for disclosure, appropriation, appearing, and gathering.
Place, therefore, loses any sense of located entities and comes to mean “that open, cleared yet
bounded region in which we find ourselves gathered
together with other persons and things, and in which
we are opened up to the world and the world to us”
(p. 221). A place is where being happens—an event
that is continually changing and open to question.
The idea of dwelling that is so prominent in
Heidegger’s later writings is clearly topological.
Dwelling embraces a number of meanings, including cherishing, protecting, caring for, and looking
after. To build involves a productive relationship to
one place, but to dwell means to be in a certain relation to place. Dwelling involves an ontological
sense of place that illuminates and is illuminated by
the place-specific processes of building, yet also
includes a grasp of mortality and the aspects of the
world that go beyond human being.
The latter are referred to figuratively by Heidegger as the earth, the sky, and the gods—terms
open to wide interpretation but which can respectively be taken to mean non-human nature, openness, and the ineffable. It is through these aspects of
world that human beings are able “to grasp their
own being as implicated in being that goes beyond a
human life” (p. 275). Dwelling might therefore be
described as an enlightened understanding of beingin-place. In turn, building that is informed by dwelling will tread lightly and be responsive to the context of a specific place.
Dwelling stands in opposition to what Heidegger called “the oblivion of being” in the modern
world and which Malpas suggests is “perhaps the
most important theme” in his later work (p. 279). A
consequence of the framework of rationalistic technology is a forgetfulness of being in which instrumental notions of efficiency, measurement, and reserves of resources come to treat the world as an
object and a source of raw materials.
Similarly, new technologies of communication
shrink distances. “Yet,” Heidegger wrote, “the frantic abolition of all distance brings us no nearness.
Short distance is not nearness. Nor is great distance
remoteness.” Place is reduced to spatial position and
being is forgotten.

From Heidegger’s Topology
[Heideggerian topology is] essentially a meditative concern with the way in which a particular environing
“world” comes forth around a particular mode of “emplacement” in that world. Heideggerian topology can
thus be understood as an attempt to evoke and illuminate
that placed abode. In this respect, topology is an attempt
to illuminate a place in which we already find ourselves
and in which other things are also disclosed to us (p. 34).
[T]he place … in which philosophical questioning first
arises is the place in which we first find ourselves—that
place is not an abstract world of ideas, not a world of
sense-data or “impressions,” not a world of theoretical
“objects” nor of mere causal relata.
In finding ourselves “in” the world, we find ourselves already “in” a place, already given over to and
involved with things, with persons, with our lives. On
this basis the central questions of philosophy, questions
of being and existence, as well as of ethics and virtue,
must themselves take their determination and their starting point from this same place (p. 40).

W

hile Malpas demonstrates that the topological
aspects of Heidegger’s thinking can be traced
in all phases of his writing, they are most explicit in
the later works in which Heidegger became increasingly concerned with ideas of event, dwelling, and
gathering. Malpas suggests that, for Heidegger,
“event” and “place” often mean the same; they are
both the starting point for thinking and both offer
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W

H

eidegger’s works can be read not only as an
account of the links between place and being
but also as a sustained, albeit largely implicit, critique of rationalism. There are many indications that
industrial technologies have changed the relationships between human beings and the world, and that
this shift is related to the rise of rationalism in the
last 400 years. Foucault and others have documented this rise and have pointed to indications that
it has overstayed its welcome and begun to decline.
Indeed, there is evidence of this decline in the very
revival of interest in place as a phenomenon of experience (rather than as spatial location) that has
occurred in the last 30 years and to which Heidegger’s Topology is a substantial contribution.
I am predisposed toward place in all its “iridescent, multiple, shifting character” (p. 37) and, in
Heidegger’s Topology and his other work, Malpas
discloses the ontological source for the fragments of
the academic explosion of recent research on place
and reset the grounds for future research. The result
is a strong foundation for shifting the balance away
from the rationalistic, calculative approach, in all its
bureaucratic, corporate and climate-changing manifestations, to a view of the world that is responsible
toward being and place.

hile I find this later part of Heidegger’ s work
appealing because it reinforces my own
doubts about modern placelessness, I also think it is
his most superficial thinking. It is almost as though
Heidegger looked up, noticed that the world he
lived in didn’t have much resemblance to the one he
was thinking about, didn’t like it much and felt
obliged to comment.
He seems to have shifted from rigorous phenomenological description to a selective historical
judgment that implies that the quality of dwelling in
classical Greece, as manifest in a few archeological
sites, was somehow better than that manifest in
power stations along the Rhine in the 1950s. I know
of no way to distinguish between the quality of
dwelling of, for example, a peasant living in a
squalid hut on the fringes of the Black Forest in the
13th century and worried about surviving next winter, and that of a single mother living in social housing in South Chicago and worried about whether the
food bank can get her family through next month.
Malpas mirrors Heidegger’s critique of modern
technology. He writes that one of its obvious consequences is a disruption of our sense of place, which
he discusses in terms of loss of nearness, forgetfulness of being, and an inability to grasp limits to
human activity. As a way to escape this disruption,
he refers to Heidegger’s idea of “composure toward
technology”—in other words, a way of being that
involves acceptance but not submission to technology. He suggests that achieving such composure
depends on poetic dwelling that involves “a return
to the openness and indeterminacy of the world and
to the experience of wonder” (p. 310).
Given the forcefulness of his argument that
place and being are inextricably linked, this conclusion seems insubstantial. But Heidegger seems to
have been unable to suggest what to do next. His
final essay was titled, “Only a god can save us”—a
phrasing that was disingenuous and evasive. The
essential point I take from Heidegger is not historical. The fact is that, in every age and in every individual and in every place, there are tendencies to
“the oblivion of being,” and it is always necessary
to find appropriate ways of being, dwelling, and
building that will challenge these tendencies.
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Disclosing the Depths of Heidegger’s Topology:
A Response to Relph
Jeff Malpas
Malpas is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania and author of Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topology (Cambridge University Press, 1999). John Cameron and Ingrid Stefanovic provided reviews of this book in the spring 2004 EAP; Malpas, in turn, responded to those reviews in the fall 2004 issue
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I

Even the work of a theorist such as Henri Lefebvre (esp. Lefebvre 1991), so often cited as a key
figure in the literature on place, turns out to be important, less for his elucidation of the concept than
for the prioritization of space and place as acceptable terms within critical discourse (moreover, in
Lefebvre, one finds much the same treatment of
space and place as effects of social and economic
factors as is evident in Harvey’s own Lefebvrianinflected writing). Much the same is true of other
prominent theorists such as Foucault and even
Deleuze and Guattari.
Part of Heidegger’s importance is the central
role his work played in enabling the appearance of
place (and space) as a key theoretical concept in
writers such as Lefebvre and Foucault (a point that
Stuart Elden’s work has done much to establish—
see, for instance, Elden 2001). Furthermore, Heidegger is one of the few philosophers and the only
major 20th-century thinker to thematize place as
such and to provide an analysis of its structure and
significance—so much so that the later Heidegger
could refer to his own work as a “topology of being.” For anyone interested in the attempt to say
more about place than is available in the work of
thinkers like Harvey and Massey (or Lefebvre and
Foucault), Heidegger must be essential reading.

n his review of my Heidegger’s Topology, Edward Relph acknowledges the importance of
Heidegger’s thought in the contemporary turn to
place within the humanities and social sciences, just
as he acknowledges the importance of the philosophical inquiry into place as such. Relph is also particularly generous in his estimation of the role of
my work, in Heidegger’s Topology and elsewhere,
in contributing to this renewed interest in place.
Moreover, Relph provides a strikingly apt and
vivid image of the way the concept of “place” has,
in recent years, “exploded” across many different
areas and disciplines in a proliferation of different
forms and uses. While there are many works that
deploy various senses of place and that also delineate the detailed textures and forms of particular
places, when it comes to the theoretical inquiry into
place, the focus for the most part is not on place as
such but either on the effects of place or on place
itself as an effect of other processes.
Relph notes that David Harvey, for instance,
treats place as a social construction, claiming that
the only interesting question then concerns the social processes that give rise to place (Harvey 1996,
pp. 293-94). Here, place is nothing more than an
effect. Doreen Massey, on the other hand, treats
place, which she refuses to distinguish from space,
as significant largely in terms of the consequences
of our imagination of place (Massey 2005, esp. pp.
5-8). Here, the effects of place are given priority.

Y

et while Relph and I seem to be in agreement
on the importance of Heidegger as a central
figure in the thinking of place, we disagree in our
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constitutes a highly partial reading of Heidegger’s
articulation.
What is at issue in Heidegger’s talk of dwelling
is not a comparison in the “quality of life” between
different historical periods but, rather, the nature of
human being as intimately tied to place. Dwelling is
Heidegger’s name for the topological mode of being
that belongs to human being—not merely the human in some selected historical period but to the
human “as such.”
Precisely because humans dwell, the technological transformation of the world associated with
modernity is such a challenge—an affront, even, to
what it is to be human. The essential character of
human life as dwelling is contradicted and obscured
by the re-presentation of the human in terms of consumption, productivity, preference, and utility.
Moreover, just as Heidegger’s critique of technology is directed at a pervasive tendency that underlies technology rather than being necessarily instantiated in any particular technological device, so
too is Heidegger’ s account of dwelling intended as
a description of a fundamental mode of being rather
than something to be instantiated only in certain
lives rather than others.

assessments of just what is most significant in Heidegger’ s treatment of place.
Focusing on the concept of dwelling that looms
so large in Heidegger’s later thinking, Relph observes that, while he finds this aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy “appealing because it reinforces
my own doubts about modern placelessness” (Relph
1976, 1981), he nevertheless views it as “the most
superficial” aspect of Heidegger’s thought. Relph
takes the turn toward the concept of dwelling in
later Heidegger as indicative of a shift from “rigorous phenomenological description to a selective historical judgment.”
There is no doubt that there is a move away
from a certain conception of phenomenology in
Heidegger, although as I note toward the end of
Heidegger’s Topology, there is an important sense in
which a form of “phenomenological seeing” remains central to all Heidegger’s thinking (Malpas,
2006, pp. 307-8). I would, however, certainly dispute Relph’s claim that what characterizes the later
Heidegger is a shift to a “selective historical judgment,” just as I would also take issue with Relph’s
judgment as to the superficiality of the Heideggerian account of dwelling.
It is important to note that the concept of dwelling is already present in Being and Time. In a brief
and highly condensed passage in §12 (the main elements of which reappear in “Building Dwelling
Thinking”), Heidegger distinguishes the way in
which Dasein is “in” its world from the way in
which a physical entity is “in” space (a sense of spatial-physical “containment” that allows one thing to
be said to be “in” another as the water is “in” the
glass or the glass is “in” the room). Heidegger refers
to this first sense of “in” in terms of dwelling (see
Heidegger, 1962, H54).
As deployed in Being and Time, the concept of
dwelling remains obscure and problematic (Malpas
2006, pp. 74-83).In Heidegger’s later thinking,
however, it becomes one of the central ideas in his
articulation of the enriched conception of place, one
that includes both spatial and temporal elements to
which human being is tied. In this respect, it is a
mistake to see the notion of dwelling as tied to some
pre-modern mode of life. Not only does this interpretation render the concept superficial but also

A

lthough Relph rejects the Heideggerian concept of dwelling as “superficial,” he is rather
more sympathetic toward Heidegger’s critique of
technology that Relph reinterprets as a critique of
“rationalism.” I think that the use of the latter term
here is ill-advised. While there is a certain calculative rationality that Heidegger views as problematic,
it is a serious mistake, even if a widespread one, to
treat Heidegger as an ‘ anti-rationalist’ in any more
general sense. There are, however, undoubtedly important points of convergence between Heidegger’s
account of modern technology and its essence (what
Heidegger refers to as “das Gestell”—“the Framework”) and accounts to be found in the work of
other 20th-century thinkers, including Foucault’s
analysis of the rise of governmentality and the biopolitical; Weber’s description of the processes of
rationalisation and bureaucratization; and Adorno’s
account of instrumental rationality.
Such convergence is perhaps unsurprising
given the prevalence of ideas concerning the problems and limits of technology in pre-war European
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logical modernity topologically, we can see how it
actually transforms our experience of place in ways
that are at odds with the underlying character of
place, and the underlying character even of that
mode of being that belongs to technological modernity itself, but which it also conceals.
My emphasis on the importance of concepts
like openness, indeterminacy, wonder, questionability, and associated modes of comportment is intended to direct attention toward key elements in an
experience of place that obscures neither our embeddedness in place and the nature of that embeddedness nor the character of place as such.
Moreover, that we should look for a more concrete solution to the problems of technological
modernity, while unsurprising, is also mistaken. Our
contemporary situation is not the result of a process
over which we, either collectively or individually,
have mastery. Indeed, the desire for mastery and the
appearance of the entire world as potentially subject
to control is itself an integral element in the particular formation of the world that is technological
modernity. The relinquishing of the desire for control and the recognition of the extent to which allencompassing solutions are beyond us will be key
elements in that “other beginning” that might presage the shift to a truly “post-modern,” “posttechnological” world.

thinking. What makes Heidegger’s account distinctive, however, is the way in which the critique of
technology is tied to a topological analysis of which
Heidegger’s account of dwelling is an integral part.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the essay,
“The Thing”—itself part of the original lecture sequence from which “The Question Concerning
Technology” also came—which begins with Heidegger’s announcement of the phenomenon that has
come to be known as “time-space compression”
(Heidegger 1971, p. 163; Malpas 2006, pp. 278-79).
Relph assumes a connection between “rationalism” and the loss of place. Not only does he associate such “rationalism” with placelessness, but he
also sees evidence of the decline of “rationalism” in
the resurgence of interest in place. It remains unclear, however, how or why such a connection
should obtain. If my account is correct, Heidegger
provides an answer that works through the elucidation of place in relation to being and, in terms of
dwelling, to human being. An answer is also pointed
to through his analysis of the way in which technology operates in relation to place.
The fact that Relph seems not to have appreciated this aspect of Heidegger’s topological thinking
may indicate a deficiency in my presentation in
Heidegger’s Topology. It may well be the case that
much more needs to be said to bring out the complexity and detail of Heidegger’s later thought,
though I suspect that part of the difficulty here is
that any writing on the later Heidegger still stands
under the shadow of the often partial and superficial
readings that have dominated much of the literature
to date and that pervade the broader appropriation
of Heideggerian thinking.

T

he later Heidegger’s apparently weary insistence on the limits in our ability to change the
world’s course should not be construed as a failure
of vision or some lapse into quietistic resignation. It
follows directly from a recognition of the essentially placed character of human being and the limitation and fragility following inevitably from it.
If it were possible to reconfigure our current
forms of social and political organisation around a
recognition of such placedness, then we would have
a solution to many of our contemporary ills. Yet
there is no concrete way in which such a wholesale
reconfiguration can be brought away in a directed
and purposive manner.
What we can do is work, as Heidegger suggests, in the many small ways that are available to
us, to reorient ourselves to our actual situation and
to the proper place in which find ourselves. Beyond

R

elph finds the Heideggerian response to the
danger of technological modernity (at least as I
articulate that response in Heidegger’s Topology, in
terms of the importance of ideas of openness, indeterminacy, wonder and, though not mentioned by
Relph, questionability [Malpas 2006, pp. 302-03])
to be “insubstantial” and Heidegger’s own comment
in the Der Spiegel interview—“only a god can save
us”—to be disingenuous and evasive.
I can sympathize with Relph’s dissatisfaction
here, but I think it misses the point concerning what
is at issue. Once we analyse the operation of techno-
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eidegger’s Topology attempts to provide an
account of the way in which place provides a
starting point for Heidegger’ s thinking as well as an
idea toward which it develops. Indeed, it is only in
the very late thinking, from perhaps 1947 onward,
that Heidegger’s topology emerges in a fully developed form (although a form that can only be appreciated when viewed in terms of the problems in the
earlier thinking to which it is also a response).
If we are to take Heidegger as making a significant contribution to the philosophical analysis of
place in the 20th century, then it must be primarily
on the basis of the later thinking rather than the earlier. But the later thinking also makes demands on
the reader that are much greater than those of the
earlier work—demands that follow, in part, from
Heidegger’ s own attempts to think topologically—
and as a result the later thinking is more prone to
being misread and misconstrued.
I had hoped that Heidegger’s Topology would
go some way toward correcting this tendency, but if
Relph’s comments are taken as an indication, the
work would seem to have fallen short of at least one
of its objectives. On the other hand, if the sort of
topology or topography in which I take Heidegger
to have been engaged and to which I take my own
work to be a contribution does constitute a different,
if not entirely unprecedented, mode of thinking,
then perhaps one simply has to accept certain inevitable difficulties in the communication and elucidation of that thinking.
Heidegger’s Topology does not, however, stand
alone. Not only does it seem to me to be supported
by the work of others in the same field, most notably, by that of Ed Casey, but it should also be read
against the background of my other work. In this
respect, Heidegger’s Topology is only the second
book in what should be a sequence of works that
will together, I hope, provide a more fully elaborated account of the philosophical topology that is
adumbrated in Heidegger.

H

Building & Dwelling
To spare and preserve is to “let be,” but not through a withdrawal so much as a certain mode of engagement, and in
“Building Dwelling Thinking,” the manner in which human
beings are engaged with things and in the world is through
that by which the idea of dwelling is itself introduced,
namely, “building.”
Building is the activity that produces, that brings things
forth, either through cultivation or through construction….
All human being involves building, and so stands in an important relation to the Greek “techne,” itself understood by
Heidegger in terms of the disclosing or “letting-appear” that
lies behind our word “technology.”
Yet the productive activity of building is not simply
identical with technology, with any technique, nor with any
technical enterprise such as architecture or engineering.
Building is that mode of productive activity that articulates
the world in a way that allows for human dwelling.
But this means that building must be understood as arising on the basis of dwelling rather than being that on which
dwelling is itself based. Thus Heidegger writes that “Only
if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.”
Building is the productive activity through which human
beings make a place for themselves in the world and so by
means of which their own dwelling is articulated….
The building that is undertaken on the basis of our proper
dwelling is a building that allows for such dwelling and so
allows for the gathering of the fourfold—it is a building
that itself spares and preserves through allowing human
beings to engage with things in a way that reflects the unitary and differing character of things. True building produces things that allow the world and the things that make
up the world to come forth in their abundance and multiplicity—true building produces, as it also works in relation
to, “things”; true building makes for, as it also arises in,
places (Heidegger’s Topology, p. 271).

12
DOI:

12

Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 19 [2008], No.

Letter from Far South
John Cameron
Recently retired from academia, Cameron is an Honorary Associate of the Place Research Network in the
School of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania. In sending this piece, he explains: “I‘m setting out to write
an occasional letter from our place on Bruny Island, just off the southeastern coast of Tasmania, the island state
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letter has been enriched by the writings of David Abram, Henry Bortoft, Edward Casey, Jeff Malpas, Edward
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A

delicate elongated driftwood heron in our kitchen
window facing the water, opposite the wall on which
hangs one of her watercolor herons.

pair of herons reside very close to our house.
They are nesting now, and I am often stopped
in my tracks in the early morning by the
sound of their strangely guttural mating cries or the
sight of their slow lolloping wing beat in unison as
they fly by, one of them often carrying a dry branch
in his or her beak. The White-faced Herons (Egretta
novaehollandiae) stand over two feet tall, pale misty
grey in color with yellow legs and rounded white face
that seems to emphasize their delicacy and alertness.
My partner Vicki has painted several watercolors
of the heron, bringing patient observation and decades of painting experience to her deceptively simple
and evocative depictions. She has also been working
in a completely new medium for her—assembling
pieces of driftwood to convey the essence of each of
the shorebirds we encounter.
When we climb down to the rocky beach immediately below us, we pick our way through the morning’s offering from the sea—strands of seaweed,
fragments of whelk, cowrie and oyster shell, plastic
drink bottles, and driftwood pieces suggestive of bird
necks, beaks, or bodies. We always have avian company—kelp gulls wailing and mewing; a tern dipping
its wing slightly before plummeting into the water to
dive for a fish; a pied cormorant, part fish, part bird,
part snake, slipping below the water, then surfacing
and slapping the water vigorously with its wings to
gain purchase for takeoff when fully laden with fish.
When we have gathered a good supply of the
morning’s treasures, we carry them up to Vicki’s shed
where a profusion of shapes are in all stages of being
transformed from wood to bird. She has placed a

O

ne recent morning, gazing out that window, I
saw the heron with its rounded white face motionless at the edge of the water amid the grey ellipses of rock in the mist. Its presence in living,
sculpted, painted form brought forth several memories. One day we were watching the heron alight onto
a large horizontal dead branch overlooking the shore.
It perched, looking out over the water as intently as
we were looking at it. My focus shifted from the
heron to the branch, and I was startled to see how
closely the end of the branch mirrored the shape of
the bird. The angles between thrust forward head,
sinuous neck, and spindly legs were the same. The
tree ceased being a eucalypt of undistinguished shape
and became the “heron tree.” Here was the very correspondence between wood and live bird that Vicki
was creating with her sculptures.
The second memory was of the role that the
heron played in our finding this place initially. We
were relaxing with our friends Pete Hay and his wife
Anna at their weekend place on Bruny Island after
the successful conclusion of a “Sense of Place” colloquium in southern Tasmania. On our last morning,
when we were due to fly back home to Sydney, Pete,
a colloquium co-organizer and a passionate poet and
place writer, suggested a pre-breakfast boating excursion, to which I readily agreed.
For no particular reason, we turned southward
rather than northward as on our previous outings.
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T

here are several ways to view what happened
that day. From one viewpoint, the heron was
simply doing what herons do, keeping its distance
and moving on as Pete got too close in his rowboat.
At the same time, we have said on more than one occasion that “heron” helped bring us here because we
would never have ventured so far otherwise, and that
the place called to us that morning.
These are not glib lines. They are full of meaning
that deepens with experience. Both views make sense
to me despite their seemingly contradictory nature.
Holding attitudes and experiences that are at odds
with each other appears to be part of living here. It
provides a creative tension—an impetus to think
through questions of how the heron might somehow
be an agent in the mysterious process of our unexpectedly moving here, or how meaningful it is to talk
of intentionality in the more-than-human world.
It is a matter of the heart as well as thought to
pay attention to the feeling of affinity that sometimes
rises in me when heron appears. Even the attitude
that heron was only instinctively avoiding human
contact comes from a feeling of respect, of valuing its
otherness, and not wanting to reduce it to merely a
figure in a human drama of my creation.
I don’t want to make more of the event than is
warranted, especially when there are so many practical environmental problems to deal with in our locality that need my attention. I hope to mull over such
issues in future letters, but for the moment saying that
heron guided us here seems to be a way of expressing
a feeling that something larger than my own conceptual mind or mere accident is at play.

Pete was in front in the rowboat with his two dogs
alert in the prow, and we paddled behind in the canoe,
enjoying the still waters of the estuary for the last
time. He’d spied a white-faced heron by the shore
and rowed closer in the hopes of photographing it.
The bird did not oblige and each time flew a little further on just as Pete prepared to photograph it.
By the time we rounded yet another rocky promontory in our canoe, Vicki and I had grown concerned
at how far we’d come and how long this expedition
was taking, given how much time was needed to
catch the Bruny ferry to the Tasmanian mainland and
be at the airport by early afternoon.
Just past the headland, the wide veranda of a
simple house appeared in view, splendidly located on
its own, overlooking the wooded coastal shore. Vicki
exclaimed that she wanted it, or to be precise,
“Wanna wanna wanna,” something I’d never heard
her say before. I commented that the current owner
would probably have an opinion on that statement. A
few more strokes of the paddle brought us in sight of
a “For Sale” sign on the shore. We were stunned.
After failing to rouse anyone by calling out, we
diverted Pete from his pursuit of the heron and persuaded him to hurry back to the shack so we could
make inquiries. With a half hour to spare, we met
with the owner on site, had a quick tour of the small
and largely unfinished house, and essentially shook
hands on the sale of the place.
As for Vicki’s uncharacteristic utterance, we
were humbled to later discover that the name the
original Nuenonne Aboriginal inhabitants gave to
Bruny Island was “Lunawanna-alonnah.” She had
voiced something of an echo of the Aboriginal name
for the island, and we subsequently learned that our
new home had been the site of significant early contact between the Nuenonne and representatives of the
first Governor with ultimately tragic consequences
when they were moved off the island.
Vicki had just finished her doctoral thesis exploring the experience of being-in-place, displacement,
trauma, and the ethics of perception based in part on
time she spent at the Aboriginal outstation of Utopia
in the Northern Territory with Anmatyerr and Alyawarr Aboriginal women artists. Our relationship
with Aboriginal people, their trauma and displacement, had just taken a new turn in an uncanny way.

W

ithout consciously intending to, we have provided ourselves with the opportunity to put
more fully into practice what we had been teaching in
“Sense of Place” classes at the University of Western
Sydney. Ecological sustainability, an essential aspect
of inhabiting place, is more of an everyday matter
here because we are not connected to power, water,
or sewage. We generate our greatly reduced electricity needs with solar panels and a wind turbine and
rely on rainwater tanks and a dry composting toilet.
Since we moved here full-time two years ago, we
have embarked on a land regeneration project on our
55 acres of overgrazed paddocks—we’ve removed
the sheep and have planted 1200 native trees grown
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ing was also a personal matter. My everyday personality is not characterized by either poise or attentiveness, yet these are qualities that attract me and to
which I aspire.
The possibility of bringing them more to life
within has opened up, but it is a razor-edged possibility. On the one side, there are days when it seems that
all I can see in the mirror of nature here are my own
shortcomings—mental turbulence in the face of the
reflective waters, resistance to change in the midst of
the continuous flux of wind and waves.
On the other side is the danger of constructing a
narrative that obscures as much as it reveals, of telling a simple storyline that belies the complex, contradictory, and erratic nature of what I’ m experiencing or makes too much of what is happening. The
middle way between self-doubting and self-deluding
stories seems to involve holding such stories lightly,
having an attitude of quiet, open-hearted acceptance
of what is—including my own human foolishness—
and care for ourselves as integral parts of this place.

from local seed and 1000 native grasses for land regeneration, wildlife habitat, and erosion control.
Experientially, because we are on the island for
about ten days at a time between trips to mainland
Tasmania for provisions (there are no shops on north
Bruny Island) and don’t watch television, we have a
far more intense and ongoing experience of this one
place. With no neighbors in view and facing an expanse of estuarine shores and waters, we focus much
attention on the more-than-human world that we are
inhabiting and our response to it.

L

iving here is also precipitating changes in the
“practices of place” that I have developed and
written about previously: Goethean science, meditation, bush regeneration, and investigation of local
natural and human history. I had expected in my “retirement” I would be able to implement this work
more thoroughly and systematically, but life has
proved otherwise. Much of my day is now spent outside spraying thistles in the paddocks, planting trees
and grasses, maintaining the tree guards, digging in
the vegetable bed and so on, whereas nearly all my
working days at the university were spent inside at
the computer screen, in classrooms, or at meetings.
The rare occasions when I have ventured down
to the shore to undertake some Goethean science, for
example, have been rewarding enough but no longer
seem sufficient in themselves, perhaps because the
context within which I am carrying them out has
changed so radically. Rather, they are pointing toward a more flexible and integrated way of being
outdoors here, enabling me to move in and out of
task-oriented action, sensuous appreciation, and intuitive or meditative states, without allocating certain
periods of time for each.
I say “pointing the way toward,” because for
much of the time, the directed activities tend to
overwhelm other sensibilities that emerge only as an
occasional glimpse. Even though progress is slow, it
has increasingly felt contrary to the spirit of these
practices, as well as being impractical, to schedule
them into a part of the day.

A

s I write this, I am also very aware of the precariousness of the situation we all face. There
are many threats, such as tree dieback, erosion, and
introduced weeds, to this narrow fringe of coastal
woodland, and our capacity to keep living here can
be so easily broken by illness or misadventure.
Yet, heron nests are being built, the recently
planted trees are putting down roots, as are we, so
there is hope for the new season. I sense that we are
participating—heron, Vicki and I—in an unfolding
relationship that has many dimensions.
We are becoming familiar with each other’s habits. Our feeling for heron grows as the story of our
being here develops. We are working physically to
create more habitat for birds. We move quietly to respect everyone’s space as much as we can, and some
of our avian friends are approaching us more closely
these days. Vicki’s creative response to the presence
of heron and the other birds is flourishing.
My wonderment and appreciation of the whole
process grows as I write my way into it. Writing, too,
is one of the ways in which I am participating in this
three-way connection. It is helping to illuminate the
depth of the relationships, how to hold lightly the
complexity of living here and to accept it with an attentive heart.

I

felt surrounded that morning by the many manifestations of heron in front of me. Heron wasn’t
simply “out there” in all its forms, manifesting what I
could best describe as poised attentiveness. The feel-
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